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ABSTRACT
Modern machine learning models are typically highly accurate but have been
shown to be vulnerable to small, adversarially-chosen perturbations of the input.
There are two main models of attacks considered in the literature: black-box and
white-box. We consider these threat models as two ends of a fine-grained spec-
trum, indexed by the number of queries the adversary can ask. Using this point
of view we investigate how many queries the adversary needs to make to design
an attack that is comparable to the best possible attack in the white-box model.
We analyze two classical learning algorithms on two synthetic tasks for which we
prove meaningful security guarantees. The obtained bounds suggest that some
learning algorithms are inherently more robust against query-bounded adversaries
than others.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern neural networks achieve high accuracy on tasks such as image classification (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012) or speech recognition (Collobert and Weston, 2008). However, they are typically sus-
ceptible to small, adversarially-chosen perturbations of the inputs (Szegedy et al., 2014; Nguyen
et al., 2015): more precisely, given a correctly-classified input x, one can typically find a small per-
turbation δ such that x+ δ is misclassified by the network while to the human eye this perturbation
is not perceptible.
There are two main threat models considered in the literature: black-box and white-box. In the
white-box model, on the one hand, the attacker (Biggio et al., 2013; Zheng et al., 2019) is assumed
to have access to a full description of the model. For the case of neural networks that amounts to
a knowledge of the architecture and the weights. In the black-box model, on the other hand, the
adversary (Papernot et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016; Xiao et al., 2018; Hayes and
Danezis, 2017) can only observe the input-output behavior of the model. Many defenses have been
proposed to date. To mention just some – adversarial learning (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al.,
2018; Trame`r et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2019), input denoising (Bhagoji et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2017),
or more recently, randomized smoothing (Le´cuyer et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al.,
2019; Gluch and Urbanke, 2019). Unfortunately, most heuristic defenses break in the presence of
suitably strong adversaries (Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018)
and provable defenses are often impractical or allow only very small perturbations. Thus a full
defense remains elusive. The current literature on this topic is considerable. We refer the reader to
Chakraborty et al. (2018) for an overview of both attacks and defenses and to Bhambri et al. (2019)
for a survey focused on black-box attacks.
We consider black-box and white-box models as the extreme points of a spectrum parameterized by
the number of queries allowed for the adversary. This point of view is related to Ilyas et al. (2018)
where the authors design a black-box attack with a limited number of queries. Intuitively, the more
queries the adversary can make the more knowledge he gains about the classifier. When the number
of queries approaches infinity then we transition from a black-box to a white-box model as in this
limit the adversary knows the classifying function exactly. Using this point of view we ask:
How many queries does the adversary need to make to reliably find adversarial examples?
By “reliably” we mean comparable with the information-theoretic white-box performance. To be
more formal, we assume that there is a distribution D and a high-accuracy classifier f that maps
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Rd to classes Y . The adversary A only has black-box access to f . Moreover,  ∈ R+ is an upper
bound on the norm (usually `p norm) of the allowed adversarial perturbation. Assume that f is
susceptible to -bounded adversarial perturbations for an η-fraction of the underlying distribution
D. The quantity η is the largest error an adversary, who has access to unbounded computational
resources and fully knows f , can achieve. We ask: How many queries to the classifier f doesA need
to make in order to be able to find adversarial examples for say an η/2 fraction of the distribution
D? This question is similar to problems considered in Ashtiani et al. (2020). The difference is that
in Ashtiani et al. (2020) the authors define the query complexity of the adversary as a function of
the number of points for which the adversarial examples are to be found. Moreover, they require
the adversary to be perfect, that is to find adversarial examples whenever they exist. This stands
in contrast to our approach that only requires the adversary to succeed for say a 1/2 fraction of the
adversarial examples. The question we ask is also similar to ideas in Cullina et al. (2018). In this
paper the authors consider a generalization of PAC learning and ask how many queries an algorithm
requires in order to learn robustly. Similar questions were also asked in Yin et al. (2019) and Schmidt
et al. (2018). The difference is that we focus on the query complexity of the attacker and not the
defender.
Our contributions. We introduce a new notion - the query complexity (QC) of adversarial at-
tacks. This notion unifies the two most popular attack models and enables a systematic study of
robustness of learning algorithms against query-bounded adversaries.
Our two most important findings are the following: (i) for a broad class of learning algorithms
we prove a security guarantee against query-bounded adversaries that grows with accuracy; (ii) the
higher the entropy of the decision boundaries that are created by the learning algorithm the more
secure is the resulting system in our attack model. We present two scenarios for which we are able
to show meaningful lower bounds on the QC. The first one is a simple 2-dimensional distribution
and a nearest neighbor algorithm. For this setting we are able to prove a strong query lower bound
of Θ(m), where m is the number of samples on which the classifier was trained. For the second
example we consider the well-known adversarial spheres distribution, introduced in the seminal
paper Gilmer et al. (2018). For this learning task we argue that quadratic neural networks have a
query lower bound of Θ(d), where d is the dimensionality of the data. We discuss why certain
learning algorithms like linear classifiers and also neural networks might be far less secure than
KNN against query-bounded adversaries.
There exist tasks for which it is easy to find high-accuracy classifiers but finding robust models is
infeasible. E.g., in Bubeck et al. (2019) the authors describe a situation where it is information-
theoretically easy to learn robustly but there is no algorithm in the statistical query model that com-
putes a robust classifier. In Bubeck et al. (2018) an even stronger result is proven. It is shown that
under a standard cryptographic assumption there exist learning tasks for which no algorithm can
efficiently learn a robust classifier. Finally, in Tsipras et al. (2019) it was shown that robust and
accurate classifiers might not even exist. The query-bounded point of view shows a way to address
these fundamental difficulties – even for tasks for which it is impossible to produce a model that
is secure against a resource-unbounded adversary, it might be possible to defend against a query-
bounded adversary.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we formally define the threat model and the query com-
plexity of adversarial attacks. In Section 3 we show that the query complexity grows with accuracy
for a rich class of learning algorithms. In Section 4.1 and 4.2 we analyze the query complexity of
KNN and Quadratic Neural Network learning algorithms respectively. In Section 4.3 we present an
universal defense against query-bounded adversaries. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize the results
and discuss future directions. We defer all the proofs to the appendix.
2 THE QUERY COMPLEXITY OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
We start by formally defining the threat model. For a data distribution D over Rd and a set A ⊆ Rd
let µ(A) := PX [X ∈ A]. For simplicity we consider only separable binary classification tasks.
Such tasks are fully specified by D as well as a ground truth h : Rd → {−1, 1}. For a binary
classification task with a ground truth h : Rd −→ {−1, 1} and a classifier f : Rd −→ {−1, 1} we
define the error set as E(f) := {x ∈ supp(D) : f(x) 6= h(x)}. For x ∈ Rd and  > 0 we write
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B(x) to denote the open ball with center x and radius . We say that a function p : Rd −→ Rd is an
-perturbation if for all x ∈ Rd we have ‖p(x)−x‖2 ≤ . For n ∈ Nwe denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}
by [n]. For x, y ∈ Rd we will use [x, y] to denote the closed line segment between x and y. For
A,B ⊆ Rd we define A+B := {x+ y : x ∈ A, y ∈ B}. We use m to denote the sample size.
Definition 1 (Risk). Consider a separable, binary classification task with a ground truth h : Rd −→
{−1, 1}. For a classifier f : Rd −→ {−1, 1} we define the Risk as R(f) := PX [f(X) 6= h(X)].
Definition 2 (Adversarial risk). Consider a binary classification task with separable classes with
a ground truth h : Rd −→ {−1, 1}. For a classifier f : Rd −→ {−1, 1} and  ∈ R≥0 we define the
Adversarial Risk as:
AR(f, ) := PX [∃ γ ∈ B : f(X + γ) 6= h(X) ∧X + γ ∈ supp(D)].
For an -perturbation p we define:
AR(f, p) := PX [f(p(X)) 6= h(X) ∧ p(X) ∈ supp(D)],
to be the adversarial risk of a specific perturbation function p.
Discussion. Note that Definition 2 treats a point as an adversarial example only if it belongs to
the supp(D). This can potentially decrease the adversarial risk significantly but as shown in the
literature on-manifold adversarial examples still exist. For instance in Gilmer et al. (2018) authors
show a synthetic dataset for which they successfully find adversarial examples on the data manifold.
In Athalye et al. (2018) and Ilyas et al. (2017) the authors manage to circumvent Defense-GAN
on real datasets. Defense-GAN uses a Generative Adversarial Network to project samples onto
the manifold of the generator before classifying them. As it is reasonable to assume that GANs
approximate data distributions well this is an evidence that adversarial examples still exist on the
data manifold. The restriction simplifies the formal proof of our lower bounds (see Section 4.1 and
4.2). However, we believe that our results are not a consequence of this restriction and they carry
over essentially unchanged to the unrestricted case (modulo constants).
In order to keep the exposition simple, we restrict our discussion to `2-bounded adversarial pertur-
bations. Other norms can of course be considered and might be important in practice.
Definition 3 (Query-bounded adversary). For  ∈ R≥0 and f : Rd −→ {−1, 1} a q-bounded
adversary with parameter  is a deterministic algorithm* A that asks at most q ∈ N (potentially
adaptive) queries of the form f(x) ?= 1 and outputs an -perturbation A(f) : Rd −→ Rd.
Definition 4 (Query complexity of adversarial attacks). Consider a binary classification task T
for separable classes with a ground truth h : Rd −→ {−1, 1} and a distribution D. Assume that
there is a learning algorithm ALG for this task that given S ∼ Dm learns a classifier ALG(S) :
Rd −→ {−1, 1}. For  ∈ R≥0 define the Query Complexity of adversarial attacks on ALG with
respect to (T,m, ) and denote it byQC(ALG, T,m, ): It is the minimum q ∈ N so that there exists
a q-bounded adversary A with parameter  such that
PS∼Dm
[
AR(ALG(S),A(ALG(S))) ≥ 1
2
·AR(ALG(S), )
]
≥ 0.99.
In words, it is the minimum number of queries that is needed so that there exists an adversary who
can achieve an error of half the maximum achievable error (with high probability over the data
samples). Note that it follows from Definitions 3 and 4 thatA is computationally unbounded, knows
the distribution D and the ground truth h of the learning task and also knows the learning algorithm
ALG. The only restriction that is imposed onA is the number of allowed queries. What is important
is thatA does not know S nor the potential randomness of ALG (in the generalized setting ALG can
be randomized, see Definition 5) – this is what makes the QC non-degenerate. To see this, observe
that if A knew S and ALG was deterministic then A could achieve AR(ALG(S),A(ALG(S))) =
AR(ALG(S), ) without asking any queries. This is because A can for every point x check if there
exists γ ∈ B such that ALG(S)(X + γ) 6= h(X) and X + γ ∈ supp(D), as A can compute
ALG(S) without asking any queries. This allows A to achieve adversarial risk of AR(ALG(S), )
(see Definition 3).
*We use algorithm here since this seems more natural. But we do not limit the attacker computationally nor
are we concerned with questions of computability. Hence, function would be equally correct.
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Definition 4 can be generalized to incorporate randomness in the learning algorithm. This extension
is important as we will discuss in Section 4.3: Intuitively, the randomness in ALG can increase
the entropy of the learning process and that in turn may lead to a higher QC. Further, both the
approximation constant (which is chosen to be 1/2 in Definition 4) as well as the success probability
can also be generalized. We give the generalized definition (Definition 5) in the appendix. For the
sake of clarity we will restrict ourselves for the most part to Definition 4. This eliminates two
parameters from our expressions and restricts the attention to deterministic learning algorithms.
Only when the distinction becomes important will we refer to Definition 5.
Summary: The query complexity of adversarial attacks is the minimum q for which there exists
a q-bounded adversary that carries out a successful attack. Such adversaries are computationally
unbounded, know the learning task and the learning algorithm but don’t know the training set.
3 ROBUSTNESS AND ACCURACY – FOES NO MORE
It was argued in Tsipras et al. (2019) that there might be an inherent tension between accuracy and
adversarial robustness. We argue that this potential tension disappears for a rich class of learning
algorithms if we consider q-bounded adversaries. We show that if a learning algorithm satisfies a
particular natural property then there is a lower bound for QC of this algorithm that grows with
accuracy.
Theorem 1. Let  ∈ R≥0 and T be a binary classification task on Rd with separable classes. Let
ALG be a learning algorithm for T with the following properties:
1. ∀x ∈ supp(D), PS∼Dm [ALG(S)(x) 6= h(x)] ≤ C · δ,
2. PS∼Dm [AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η] ≥ 0.99,
3. PS∼Dm [R(ALG(S)) ≤ δ] ≥ 0.99.
Then we have:
QC(ALG, T,m, ) ≥ log
( η
3 · C · δ
)
.
The lower bound obtained in Theorem 1 is useful in situations when ALG(S) has high accuracy but
the adversarial risk is large. This is a typical situation when using neural networks – one is often
able to find classifiers that have high accuracy but they are not adversarially robust.
Summary: For a rich class of learning algorithms our security guarantee against query-bounded
adversaries increases with accuracy. A risk of 2−Ω(k) leads to robustness against Θ(k)-bounded
adversaries.
4 HIGH-ENTROPY DECISION BOUNDARIES LEAD TO ROBUSTNESS
The decision boundary of a learning algorithm applied to a given task can be viewed as the outcome
of a random process: (i) generate a training set and, (ii) apply to it the, potentially randomized,
learning algorithm. Recall, see Definitions 4 and 5, that a query-bounded adversary does not know
the sample on which the model was trained nor the randomness used by the learner. This means that
if the decision boundary has high entropy then the adversary needs to ask many questions to recover
the boundary to a high degree of precision. This suggest that high-entropy decision boundaries are
robust against query-bounded adversaries since intuitively it is clear that an approximate knowledge
of the decision boundary is a prerequisite for a successful attack. Following this reasoning, we
present two instances where high entropy of the decision boundary leads to security.
4.1 ENTROPY DUE TO LOCALITY – K-NN ALGORITHMS
Let us now analyze the QC ofK-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) algorithms. Nearest neighbor algorithms
are among the simplest and most studied algorithms in machine learning. They are also widely used
as a benchmark. It was shown in Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014) that for a sufficiently large
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Figure 1: A random decision boundary of 1-NN for Tintervals.
training set, the risk of the 1-NN learning rule is upper bounded by twice the optimal risk. It is also
known that these methods suffer from the ”curse of dimensionality” – for d dimensional distributions
they typically require m = 2Θ(d log(d)) many samples. That is why in practice one often uses some
dimensionality reduction subroutine before applying K-NN. Moreover, K-NN techniques are one
of the few learning algorithms that do not require any learning. In the naive implementation all
computation is deferred until function evaluation. This is related to the most interesting fact from
our perspective, namely that the classification rule of the K-NN algorithm depends only on the
local structure of the training set.
We argue that this property makes K-NN algorithms secure against query-bounded adversaries. In-
tuitively, if the adversary A wants to achieve a high adversarial risk she needs to understand the
global structure of the decision boundary. But if the classification rule is only very weakly corre-
lated between distant regions of the space then this intuition suggests that A may need to ask Θ(m)
many queries to guarantee a high adversarial risk. This is consistent with the entropy point of view.
Moreover there are experimental results (see Wang et al. (2018); Papernot et al. (2016)) that show
that it is hard to attack K-NN classifiers in the black-box model.
We make these intuitions formal in the following sense. We design a synthetic binary learning task
in R2, where the data is uniformly distributed on two parallel intervals – correspondiing to the two
classes. We then show a Θ(m) lower bound for the QC of 1-NN algorithm for this learning task.
This means that the number of queries the adversary needs to make to attack 1-NN is proportional to
the number of samples on which the algorithm was ”trained”. We conjecture that a similar behavior
occurs in higher dimensions as well.
4.1.1 K-NN – QC LOWER BOUNDS
Consider the following distribution. Let m ∈ N and z ∈ R+. Let L−, L+ ⊆ R2 be two parallel
intervals of length m placed at distance z apart. More formally, L− := [(0, 0), (m, 0)], L+ =
[(0, z), (m, z)]. Let the binary learning task Tintervals(z) be as follows. We generate x¯ ∈ R2 uniformly
at random from the union L− ∪ L+. We assign the label y = −1 if x¯ ∈ L− and y = +1 otherwise.
In Figure 1 we visualize a decision boundary of the 1-NN algorithm for a random S ∼ Dm on the
Tintervals. Horizontal lines, black and gray, represent the two classes, crosses are data points, white
and gray regions depict the classification rule and the union of red intervals is equal to the error set.
We also include more visualizations in the appendix. The main result of this subsection is:
Theorem 2. The 1-Nearest Neighbor algorithm applied to the learning task Tintervals(z) satisfies:
QC(1-Nearest Neighbor, Tintervals, 2m, z) ≥ Θ(m),
provided that z = Ω(1).
Summary: The K-NN algorithm learns classification rules that depend only on the local structure
of the data. This implies high-entropy decision boundaries, which in turn leads to robustness against
query-bounded adversaries. The QC of 1-NN scales at least linearly with the size of the training set.
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4.2 ENTROPY DUE TO SYMMETRY - QUADRATIC NEURAL NETWORKS
In this section we analyze the QC of Quadratic Neural Networks (QNN) applied to a learning task
defined in Gilmer et al. (2018). Let Sd−1r := {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖2 = r}. The distribution D is defined
by the following process: generate x ∼ U [Sd−11 ] and b ∼ U{−1, 1} (where U denotes the uniform
distribution). If b = −1 return (x,−1), otherwise return (1.3x,+1).
The QNN is a single hidden-layer network where the activation function is the quadratic function
σ(x) = x2. There are no bias terms in the hidden layer. The output node computes the sum of the
activations from the hidden layer, multiplies them by a scalar and adds a bias. If we assume that the
hidden layer contains h nodes then the network has d·h+2 parameters. It was shown in Gilmer et al.
(2018) that the function that is learned by QNN has the form y(x) =
∑d
i=1 αiz
2
i −1, where the αi’s
are scalars that depend on the parameters of the network and z = M(x) for some orthogonal matrix
M . The decision boundary is thus
∑d
i=1 αiz
2
i = 1, which means that it is an ellipsoid centered at
the origin.
In a series of experiments performed for the Concentric Spheres (CS) dataset in Gilmer et al. (2018)
it was shown that a QNN trained with N = 106 many samples with d = 500 and h = 1000 learns
a classifier with an estimated error of approximately 10−20 but the adversarial risk η is high and is
estimated to be 1/2 when  ≈ 0.18. On the theoretical side, it was proven in Gluch and Urbanke
(2019) (see Section 9.1) that
 ≤ O
(
log(η/δ)
d
)
. (1)
In words, equation 1 gives an upper bound on the biggest allowed perturbation  in terms of the risk δ
the adversarial risk η and the dimension d. In particular if we want the classifier to be adversarially
robust for  = Θ(1) (that is for perturbations comparable with the separation between the two
classes) then δ = 2−Ω(d). Even robustness of only  = Θ(1/
√
d) requires the risk to be as small as
δ = 2−Ω(
√
d). These results paint a bleak picture of the adversarial robustness for CS.
The QC point-of-view is more optimistic. Using results from Section 3 we first show that if the
network learns classifiers with risk 2−Ω(k) then it automatically leads to a lower bound on the QC
of Θ(k). Moreover, for a simplified model of the network, we show that even if the risk of the
learned classifier is only a small constant, say 0.01, then this results in a lower bound on the QC of
Θ(d) for perturbations of Θ(1/
√
d). Using equation 1 our result guarantees security against Θ(d)-
bounded adversaries for perturbations which are Θ(
√
d) times bigger than the best possible against
unbounded adversaries. This shows that restricting the power of the adversary can make a significant
difference.
We argue that the obtained Θ(d) lower bound is close to the real QC for this algorithm and learning
task. Observe that the decision boundary of the network is an ellipsoid which can be described by
O(d2) parameters (d2 for the rotation matrix and d for lengths of principal axes). This suggest that it
should be possible to design a O(d2)-bounded adversary that succeeds on this task. Assuming that
this is indeed the case, our lower bound is only a factor O(d) away from the optimum.
The results of this section can be understood in the following way. The relatively simple structure
of the decision boundaries allows the adversary to attack the model with only O(d2) queries. There
is however enough entropy in the network to guarantee a lower bound for the QC of Θ(d). This
entropy intuitively comes from the rotational invariance of the dataset and in turn of the learned
decision boundary. We conjecture that algorithms like linear classifiers (e.g., SVMs) exhibit a similar
behavior. That is, for natural learning tasks they are robust against q-bounded adversaries only for
q = O(poly(d)). The reason is that all these algorithms generate classifiers with relatively simple
decision boundaries which can be described by O(poly(d)) parameters.
But this is not the end of the story for CS. Our results don’t preclude the possibility that there exist a
learning algorithm that is secure against q-bounded adversaries for q  d. In fact in Section 4.3 we
present an off-the-shelf solution that can be applied to CS dataset and which, by injecting entropy,
achieves security against k-bounded adversaries for  = Θ
(
1
k
√
d
)
.
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Table 1: QC for CS
Error distribution Lower bound
Cap(0.01) Θ(d)
Capsi.i.d.k (0.01) Θ(d)
†
CapsGk (0.01) Θ(d/k)
†
4.2.1 QUADRATIC NEURAL NETWORKS – QC LOWER BOUNDS
Using the results from Section 3 one can show that increased accuracy leads to increased robustness.
More precisely if QNN has a risk of 2−Ω(k) then it is secure against Θ(k)-bounded adversaries for
 = 0.3. The proof of this fact is deferred to the appendix.
Now we argue that also in the case where the risk achieved by the network is as large as
a constant then QNN are still robust against Θ(d)-bounded adversaries. We first argue that
any reasonable optimization algorithm applied to QNN for the CS learning task gives rise
to a distribution on error sets that is rotational invariant. This follows from the fact that
D itself is rotational invariant. Now observe that for QNN the error sets are of the form:{
x ∈ Sd−11 :
∑d
i=1 αiz
2
i > 1
}
∪
{
x ∈ Sd−11.3 :
∑d
i=1 αiz
2
i < 1
}
, as the decision boundary learned
by QNN is defined by
∑d
i=1 αiz
2
i = 1, where z = Mx for some orthonormal matrix M . This set
might be quite complicated as it is basically defined as the intersection of a sphere and an ellipsoid.
We will refer to the real distribution on error sets of QNN as EQNN.
In the rest of this section we first introduce a set of distributions over error sets and then we state QC
lower bounds for these distributions. Formal definitions are presented in Definition Distributions on
Spherical Caps in the appendix, here we give a short description of what they are. For y ∈ Sd−11 let
cap(y, r, τ) := Sd−1r ∩{x ∈ Rd : 〈x, y〉 ≥ τ}. Let τ : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] be such that for every δ ∈ [0, 1]
we have µ(cap(·, 1, τ(δ)))/µ(Sd−11 ) = δ. For δ ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ N+ they are: Cap(δ) - one randomly
rotated spherical cap occupying a δ fraction of Sd−11 ; Cap
i.i.d
k (δ) - union of k i.i.d. randomly rotated
spherical caps, each occupying a δ/k fraction of either Sd−11 or S
d−1
1.3 , chosen uniformly at random;
CapGk (δ) - k randomly rotated spherical caps, each occupying a δ/k fraction of either S
d−1
1 or S
d−1
1.3 ,
chosen uniformly at random; the relative positions of cap’s normal vectors are determined by G,
where G is a given distribution on (Sd−11 )k .
We conjecture that Cap, Capsi.i.d.d , Caps
G
d have QCs that are no larger than the QC of EQNN. The
intuitive reason is that they contain less entropy than EQNN and so it should be easier to attack these
distributions. In Lemma 1 we prove a Θ(d) lower bound for Cap and, in the appendix, we give a
matching upper bound of Θ(d). Also in the appendix, we give two reductions that lower-bound QC
of Capsi.i.d.d and Caps
G
d based on a conjecture (see Cap conjecture in the appendix). We summarize
the proved and conjectured lower bounds in Table 1.
Lemma 1 (Lower bound for Cap). There exists δ > 0 such that if a q-bounded adversary A
succeeds on Cap(0.01) with approximation constant ≥ 1 − δ, error probability 2/3 for  such that
cap(·, 1, τ(0.01)) +B = cap(·, 1, 0). Then
q ≥ Θ(d).
Summary: Quadratic neural networks have simple decision boundaries - they are of the form of
ellipsoids. But due to the rotational symmetry there is sufficient entropy to guarantee robustness
against Θ(d)-bounded adversaries.
†This lower bound is conditional on Cap conjecture (in the appendix).
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4.3 HOW TO INCREASE THE ENTROPY OF AN EXISTING SCHEME – A UNIVERSAL DEFENSE
It was proven in Gluch and Urbanke (2019) that there exists a universal defense against adversarial
attacks. The defense algorithm gets as an input access to a high accuracy classifier f and outputs
a new classifier g that is adversarially robust. The idea of the defense is based on randomized
smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019) and random partitions of metric spaces. Simple
rephrasing of Theorem 5 from Gluch and Urbanke (2019) in the language of QC of adversarial
attacks gives the following:
Theorem 3. For every d ∈ N+ there exists a randomized algorithm DEF. It is given as input access
to an initial classifier Rd −→ {−1, 1} and provides oracle access to a new classifier Rd −→ {−1, 1}.
For every separable binary classification task T in Rd with separation  the following conditions
hold. Let ALG be a learning algorithm for T that uses m samples. Then for every S ∼ Dm we have
R(DEF(ALG(S))) ≤ 2R(ALG(S)) and for every ′ > 0:
QC(DEF ◦ ALG, T,m, ′) ≥ Θ
(
√
d · ′
)
.
Summary: There exists a universal defense that can be applied on top of any learning algorithm
to make it secure against query-bounded adversaries. Roughly speaking, it works by injecting addi-
tional randomness to increase the entropy of the final classifier.
4.4 DISCUSSION
For a given task the QC can vary considerably depending on the learning algorithm. Consider e.g.
the CS data set and compare the QCs of K-NN and QNN. As we mentioned in Section 4.1, for CS
K-NN might need as many as m = 2Θ(d log d) samples. This means that the lower bound Θ(m)
becomes 2Θ(d log d). Comparing that with the conjectured QC of O(d2) for QNN we see that there
can be an exponential (in d) gap between QCs of different learning algorithms for the same task. A
unifying point of view is that the QC of Θ(d2) and Θ(m) correspond in both cases to the number
of ”degrees of freedom” of decision boundary of the respective model. For the case of QNN it was
O(d2) and for the case of 1-NN it is Θ(m). We conjecture that neural networks are susceptible to
black-box attacks because their decision boundaries are low-entropy.
In this section, we demonstrated that the entropy of learned decision boundaries is closely related to
security against query-bounded adversaries. Moreover we observe that sources of the entropy can be
varied. For K-NN the entropy is high due to the locality of the learning algorithm whereas for QNN
it comes from the rotational symmetry of the data. The entropy can also be increased by introducing
randomness in the learning algorithm itself.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND TAKEAWAYS
We investigate robustness of learning algorithms against query-bounded adversaries. We start by
introducing a definition of QC of adversarial attacks and then proceed to study it’s properties. We
show a series of lower bounds for classical learning algorithms. Specifically, we show that improve-
ments in accuracy of a model lead to an improved security against query-bounded adversaries. We
give a lower bound of Θ(d) for QNNs and a lower bound of Θ(m) for 1-NN algorithm. Our anal-
ysis identifies properties of learning algorithms that make them (non-)robust. These results give a
rule-of-thumb: ”The higher the entropy of decision boundary the better” for assessing the QC of a
given algorithm.
We believe that a systematic investigation of learning algorithms from the point of view of QC
will lead to more adversarially-robust systems. Specifically, it should be possible to design generic
defenses that can be applied on top of any learning algorithm. One example of such a defense
was given in Section 4.3. Significantly more work is needed in order to fulfill the potential of this
approach. But imagine that this type of defense could be applied efficiently with only a black-
box access to the underlying classifier. And imagine further, that it could guaranteed a QC of, say
q = 2Θ(d). This would arguably solve the adversarial robustness problem.
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A GENERALIZED DEFINITIONS
We give here a generalization of Definition 4 to randomized learning algorithms and general approx-
imation constants and error probabilities.
Definition 5 (Query complexity of adversarial attacks - generalized). Consider a binary clas-
sification task T for separable classes with a ground truth h : Rd −→ {−1, 1} and a distribution
D. Assume that there is a randomized learning algorithm ALG for this task that given S ∼ Dm
and a sequence of random bits B ∼ B learns a classifier ALG(S,B) : Rd −→ {−1, 1}. For
 ∈ R≥0, κ, α ∈ [0, 1] define the Query Complexity of the adversarial attacks on ALG with respect
to (T,m, , α, κ) and denote it by QC(ALG, T,m, , α, κ): It is the minimum q ∈ N such that there
exists a q-bounded adversary A with parameter  such that
PS∼Dm,B∼B [AR(ALG(S,B),A(ALG(S,B))) ≥ α ·AR(ALG(S,B), )] ≥ 1− κ.
If the above holds forA we will refer to α as the approximation constant ofA and to κ as the error
probability of A.
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B OMITTED PROOFS - REDUCTION AND A LOWER BOUND
We now present the reduction that we will use for our QC lower bounds later on. Before delving into
the details let us explain the intuition behind this approach. Let us recall the set-up. The classifier is
trained on a sample S that is unknown to the adversary. This classifier has a particular error set. We
say that an adversary succeeds if, after asking some queries, it manages to produce an -perturbation
with the property that this perturbation moves “sufficient” mass into the error set of the classifier.
Here, sufficient means at least half of what is possible if the adversary had known the classifier
exactly. Let us say in this case that an -perturbation is consistent with an error set.
The following theorem states that if for every -perturbation the probability that an error set of
a classifier is consistent with that perturbation is small then the QC is high. This is true since
if for every -perturbation only a small fraction of probability space (i.e., the possible classifiers)
is consistent with this perturbation then A’s protocol has to return many distinct -perturbations
depending on the outcome of its queries. And to distinguish which perturbation it should return it
has to ask many queries.
Theorem 4. [Reduction.] Let  ∈ R≥0 and let T be a binary classification task on Rd with
separable classes. Let ALG be a randomized learning algorithm for T that uses m samples. Then
for every κ ∈ [0, 1] the following holds:
QC(ALG, T,m, , 1/2, κ)
≥ log
 1− κ
supp: -perturbation PS∼Dm,B∼B
[
µ(p−1(E(ALG(S,B)))) ≥ AR(ALG(S,B),)2
]
 .
Proof. We first prove the Theorem when ALG is deterministic. Let A be a q-bounded adversary
that performs a successful attack on ALG with respect to (T,m, , 1/2, κ) (as per Definition 5). We
will show that q is lower-bounded by the value from the statement of the Theorem.
The behavior ofA can be represented as a binary tree T where each non-leaf vertex v ∈ T contains
a query point xv ∈ Rd and each leaf l ∈ T contains an -perturbation pl : Rd −→ Rd. Then A
works as follows: it starts in the root r of T and queries the vertex xr. Depending on f(xr) ?= 1 it
proceeds left or right. It continues in this manner, querying the points stored in the visited vertices
until it reaches a leaf l. At the leaf it outputs the perturbation function pl.
Let us partition all possible data sets S ∈ (Rd)m depending on which leaf is reached by A when
interacting with ALG(S). Let l1, . . . , ln be the leaves of T and C1, . . . , Cn ⊆ (Rd)m be the
respective families of data sets that end up in the corresponding leaves. Let Z := {S ∈ (Rd)m :
A succeeds on S}. By assumption A is guaranteed to succeed with probability 1− κ, so
PS∼Dm [S ∈ Z] ≥ 1− κ. (2)
Now observe that for every i ∈ [n] and S ∈ Ci ∩ Z
µ(p−1li (E(ALG(S)))) ≥
AR(ALG(S), )
2
.
In words, for every S ∈ Ci ∩Z the adversaryA succeeds if at least AR(ALG(S),)2 of the probability
mass of D is moved by pli into the error set of ALG(S). Thus we get that for every i ∈ [n]:
PS∼Dm [S ∈ Ci ∩ Z] ≤ sup
p: -perturbation
PS∼Dm
[
µ(p−1(E(ALG(S)))) ≥ AR(ALG(S), )
2
]
. (3)
By standard properties of entropy we know that for a discrete random variable W any protocol ask-
ing yes-no questions that finds the value of W must on average ask at least H(W ) many questions.
Let W be a random variable that takes values in {1, 2, . . . , n}, where for every i ∈ [n] we have
P[W = i] := PS∼Dm [S ∈ Ci ∩ Z]/PS∼Dm [S ∈ Z]. Note that A’s protocol can be directly used
to find a protocol that asks yes-no questions and finds the value of W with at most q queries. It is
enough to prove a lower-bound on H(W ) as the expected number of questions can only be lower
than the maximum number.
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Note that by equation 2 and equation 3 we get that for every i ∈ [n]:
P[W = i] ≤ 1
1− κ · supp: -perturbationPS∼D
m
[
µ(p−1(E(ALG(S)))) ≥ AR(ALG(S), )
2
]
.
By properties of entropy we know that H(W ) ≥ log(1/maxi∈[n] P[W = i]), so in the end we get
that:
H(W ) ≥ log
 1− κ
supp: -perturbation PS∼Dm
[
µ(p−1(E(ALG(S)))) ≥ AR(ALG(S),)2
]
 .
The proof for the case when ALG is randomized in analogous. The only difference is that instead
of partitioning the space (Rd)m we partition the space (Rd)m × supp(B).
Remark 1. For the sake of clarity and consistency with the standard setup we fixed the approxima-
tion constant to be equal 1/2 and the data generation process to be S ∼ Dm. We note however, that
Theorem 4 (and its proof with minor changes) is also true for all approximation constants and for
general data generation processes. By different generation process we mean anything different from
S ∼ Dm, for instance a case where samples are dependent or where the number of samples m is
itself a random variable. This distinction will become important in the proof of Theorem 2.
The following theorem states that if an algorithm ALG applied to a learning task satisfies the fol-
lowing: ALG learns low-risk classifier with constant probability, the adversarial risk is high with
constant probability and every point from the support of the distribution is misclassified with small
probability then the QC of ALG is high. The core of the proof is the reduction from Theorem 4.
Theorem 1. Let  ∈ R≥0 and T be a binary classification task on Rd with separable classes. Let
ALG be a learning algorithm for T with the following properties:
1. ∀x ∈ supp(D), PS∼Dm [ALG(S)(x) 6= h(x)] ≤ C · δ,
2. PS∼Dm [AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η] ≥ 0.99,
3. PS∼Dm [R(ALG(S)) ≤ δ] ≥ 0.99.
Then we have:
QC(ALG, T,m, ) ≥ log
( η
3 · C · δ
)
.
Proof. Let p : Rd −→ Rd be any function. For simplicity we introduce the notation ρ :=
PS∼Dm [AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η ∧R(ALG(S), ) ≤ δ]. We define two new data distributions:
D1 := Dm| (AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η ∧R(ALG(S), ) ≤ δ) ,
D2 := Dm| (AR(ALG(S), ) < η ∨R(ALG(S), ) > δ) .
Observe that supp(D1) ∩ supp(D2) = ∅ and:
Dm = ρ · D1 + (1− ρ) · D2. (4)
Let A be an adversary that succeeds on Dm with probability 0.99. By equation 4 and the union
bound A has to succeed on D1 with probability of success s that satisfies:
ρ · s+ (1− ρ) ≥ 0.99,
or, equivalently,
s ≥ 1
ρ
(0.99− (1− ρ)) .
By Assumption 2 and 3, this implies
s ≥ 0.97. (5)
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Now observe:
ES∼D1 [µ(p−1(E(ALG(S))))]
=
∫
Rd
PS∼D1 [p(x) ∈ E(ALG(S))] dµ
=
∫
Rd
PS∼Dm [p(x) ∈ E(ALG(S))| (AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η ∧R(ALG(S), ) ≤ δ)] dµ
=
∫
Rd
PS∼Dm [p(x) ∈ E(ALG(S)) ∩AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η ∩R(ALG(S), ) ≤ δ]
PS∼Dm [AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η ∧R(ALG(S), ) ≤ δ] dµ
≤
∫
Rd
PS∼Dm [p(x) ∈ E(ALG(S))]
PS∼Dm [AR(ALG(S), ) ≥ η ∧R(ALG(S), ) ≤ δ] dµ
≤ (C · δ)/ρ
≤ 1
0.98
· C · δ, (6)
where the second equality follows from the definition of D1, third equality follows from the defi-
nition of conditioning, first inequality follows from the fact that intersection decreases probability,
second inequality is a result of Assumption 1 and the last inequality is obtained by Assumptions 2,
3 and the union bound. Using equation 6 we get:
PS∼D1
[
µ(p−1(E(ALG(S)))) ≥ AR(ALG(S), )
2
]
≤ 2 · ES∼D1 [µ(p
−1(E(ALG(S))))]
AR(ALG(S), )
by Markov inequality
≤ 2 ·
1
0.98 · C · δ
η
by equation 6 and definition of D1 (7)
Applying Theorem 4 to equation 5 and equation 7 we get that:
QC(ALG, T,m, ) ≥ log
(
0.97 · 0.98 · η
2 · C · δ
)
≥ log
( η
3 · C · δ
)
.
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C OMITTED PROOFS - K-NN
Theorem 2. The 1-Nearest Neighbor algorithm applied to the learning task Tintervals(z) satisfies:
QC(1-Nearest Neighbor, Tintervals, 2m, z) ≥ Θ(m),
provided that z = Ω(1).
Before we start with the formal proof let us give a quick overview. Rather than picking the points on
the two line segments uniformly at random we will think of them as the result of a spatial Poisson
process. This way the ”interpoint distance” between two consecutive points follows an exponential
distribution and the lengths of two consecutive such intervals are independent. We can hence con-
centrate on one such interval. Ignoring boundary effects, the length of this interval is an exponential
with mean 1. The distance between the two line segments is z. So assume at first that on the ”other”
line segment we have points ”everywhere.” In this case we will have errors in a particular interval if
its length is 2z or longer, since in this case there will be points on the other interval that are closer
than the end points of the interval. From this point of view it is relatively easy to derive upper bounds
on the risk and lower bounds on the adversarial risk. Note that due to the fact that we are operat-
ing in one dimension these two quantities are not very different. But similar examples can likely
be constructed in higher dimensions where this difference can likely be made significantly higher.
The final ingredient is then to find a lower bound on the QC. Here the crucial realization is that the
decision boundaries are very local due to the memoryless property of the interarrival process. As a
result, the knowledge of the decision boundaries up to a given point in space quickly looses its value
when we move further down the line. This is why the QC scales linearly in the number of sample
points.
Proof. For x ∈ L−∪L+ and ρ ∈ R we will use x+ρ to denote x+(ρ, 0). Finally, for x ∈ L−∪L+
we will use g(x) to denote the closest point to x in the other interval.
Data generation process. Instead of letting S ∼ D2m we will use a standard trick and employ
a Poisson sampling scheme. This will simplify our proof considerably. Specifically, we think of
the samples as being generated by two Poisson processes: Let N− be a homogeneous Poisson
process on the line defined by the extension of L− and N+ be a independent of N− homogeneous
Poisson process on the line defined by the extension of L+, both of rate λ = 1. Then we define
A− := ([0,m)× {0}) ∩N−, A+ := ([0,m)× {z}) ∩N+ and finally:
S := {(x,−1) : x ∈ A−} ∪ {(x,+1) : x ∈ A+} and
S˜ := {(x,−1) : x ∈ N−} ∪ {(x,+1) : x ∈ N+}.
By design we have E[|S|] = 2m as |S| is distributed according to Pois(2m). Moreover, using a
standard tail bound for a Poisson random variable, we get that for every t > 0:
P[||S| − 2m| ≥ t] ≤ 2e− t
2
2(2m+t) . (8)
This means that the size of the dataset generated with the new process is concentrated around
2m (with likely deviations of order
√
m). Let {x−1 , x−2 , . . . } be the points from N− with non-
negative first coordinate ordered in the increasing order and similarly let {x+1 , x+2 , . . . }. Then
note that A− = {x−1 , . . . , x−|A−|} and A+ = {x
+
1 , . . . , x
+
|A+|}. To simplify notation we let
E(S) := E(1-Nearest Neighbor(S)), E(S˜) := E(1-Nearest Neighbor(S˜)), where we recall that
E denotes the error set. Moreover let:
x−0 := max
x∈N−,x<0
x, x+0 := max
x∈N+,x<0
x
We also define the corresponding random variables {X−0 , X−1 , . . . } and {X+0 , X+1 , . . . }, where for
every i we have x−i ∼ X−i and x+i ∼ X+i .
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Lower-bounding AR(1-Nearest Neighbor(S), z). We will focus on L− as the argument for L+
is analogous. Let a, b ∈ A− be two consecutive points from A− such that b − a > 2z + 2ρ for a
parameter ρ to be chosen later. By construction, E(S) ∩ [a, b] ⊆ [a+ z, b− z]. Our aim is to lower
bound
P [[a+ z + ρ, b− z − ρ] ⊆ E(S)] .
Observe that if there exist points c, d ∈ L+ such that c ∈ [g(a+z+ρ)−
√
ρ2 + 2ρz, g(a+z+ρ)+√
ρ2 + 2ρz], d ∈ [g(b−z−ρ)−
√
ρ2 + 2ρz, g(b−z−ρ)+
√
ρ2 + 2ρz] then [a+z+ρ, b−z−ρ] ⊆
E(S). As N+ is a Poisson process we get that:
|N+ ∩ [g(a+ z + ρ)−
√
ρ2 + 2ρz, g(a+ z + ρ) +
√
ρ2 + 2ρz]| ∼ Pois(2
√
ρ2 + 2ρz),
so P[N+ ∩ [g(a+ z + ρ)−
√
ρ2 + 2ρz, g(a+ z + ρ) +
√
ρ2 + 2ρz] 6= ∅] = 1− e−2
√
ρ2+2ρz , and
by the union bound over the two intervals we get that:
P [[a+ z + ρ, b− z − ρ] ⊆ E(S)] ≥ 1− 2e−2
√
ρ2+2ρz . (9)
For i ∈ N+ let Y˜i be the random variable defined as:
Y˜i := ν((E(S˜) ∩ [x−i , x−i+1)) +Bz),
where ν is one dimensional Lebesgue measure. In words, Y˜i is the random variable that is equal to
how much the interval [x−i , x
−
i+1) contributes to AR(1-Nearest Neighbor(S˜), z). Observe that Y˜i is
primarily determined by the length of [x−i , x
−
i+1) as well as where the points of N+ are located with
respect to [x−i , x
−
i+1). Using the fact that x
−
i+1 − x−i has an exponential distribution with mean 1
and equation 9 we get the following properties of Y˜i:
1. Y˜i is non-negative,
2. ∀t ≥ 2z, P[Y˜i > t] ≥ e−t−2ρ
(
1− 2e−2
√
ρ2+2ρz
)
,
3. Y˜i’s are i.i.d .
The first property (non-negativity) is true by definition. To see the second, note that in order for the
interval to contribute to the adversarial risk it needs to contribute to the standard risk, i.e., it needs
to contain points of the error set E(S). The first factor bounds the probability that the interval has
length at least t+2ρ, while the second factor (by equation 9) bounds the probability that this interval
contributes at least t to the adversarial risk. The last property is in turn is a consequence of the fact
that the inter-arrival times of a Poisson process are iid and that the points on the “other” line are
Poisson as well and independent of the first line.
Our goal now is to show that
∑m/2
i=1 Y˜i ≥ z2e−2z−2mwith high probability. Similarly to the standard
proof of the Chernoff bound, for every s, η > 0:
P
m/2∑
i=1
Y˜i ≤ ηm
 = P [e−s∑i Y˜i ≥ e−sηm]
≤ E
[
e−s
∑
i Y˜i
]
· esηm by Markov inequality
=
(
E
[
e−sY˜1
]
· e2sη
)m/2
as Y˜i’s are i.i.d. (10)
Now using Properties 1, 2 and integration by parts we get for every i ∈ N+:
E
[
e−sY˜i
]
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
se−st · P[Y˜i > t] dt (11)
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Now we lower bound the following:∫ ∞
0
se−st · P[Y˜i > t] dt
≥
∫ 2z
0
se−st · e−2z−2ρ
(
1− 2e−2
√
ρ2+2ρz
)
dt+
+
∫ ∞
2z
se−st · e−t−2ρ
(
1− 2e−2
√
ρ2+2ρz
)
dt by Property 2
= e−2ρ
(
1− 2e−2
√
ρ2+2ρz
)(
e−2z
(
1− e−2sz)+ s
s+ 1
· e−2(s+1)z
)
(12)
Now we fix the parameters ρ := 1, η := z2e
−2z−2ρ = z2e
−2z−2. Then using equation 11 and
equation 12 we get:
E
[
e−sY˜1
]
· e2sη
≤
[
1− e−2
(
1− 2e−2
√
2z+1
)(
e−2z
(
1− e−2sz)+ s
s+ 1
· e−2(s+1)z
)]
exp
(
sze−2z−2
)
(13)
Taking the derivative of expression from equation 13 with respect to s and evaluating it at s = 0 we
get:
e−2(z+1+
√
2z+1)
(
2 + 4z − e2
√
2z+1(z + 1)
)
,
which as long as z > 1 is negative. Note that expression from equation 13 evaluated at s = 0 is
equal to 1. Thus, using the fact that the derivative at 0 is negative, we get that there exists a function
κ′ : (1,∞) −→ R+ such that:
min
s>0
E
[
e−sY˜1
]
· e s·z2 e−2z−2 ≤ 1− κ′(z), (14)
which using equation 10 means that:
P
m/2∑
i=1
Y˜i ≤ z
2
e−2z−2m
 ≤ (1− κ′(z))m/2. (15)
Now for i ∈ [|A−| − 1] let Yi be the random variable defined as:
Yi := ν(((E(S) ∩ [x−i , x−i+1)) +Bz) ∩ L−).
Notice that for all i ∈ [|A−| − 1] we have Yi = Y˜i. Note that by Poisson tail bound we have:
P
[
|A−| ≤ m
2
]
≤ 2e− (m/2)
2
2(m+m/2) = 2e−m/12. (16)
Combining equation 16 and equation 15 and the union bound we get that there exists a function
κ : (1,∞) −→ R+ such that:
P
 ∑
i∈[|A−|−1]
Yi ≤ z
2
e−2z−2 ·m
 ≤ P
(|A−| ≤ m/2) ∨
m/2∑
i=1
Y˜i ≤ z
2
e−2z−2m

≤ P[|A−| ≤ m/2] + P
m/2∑
i=1
Y˜i ≤ z
2
e−2z−2m

≤ 2e−m/12 + (1− κ′(z))m/2
≤ (1− κ(z))m.
Note that we omitted the first and the last interval
([
0, x−1
)
and
[
x−|A−|,m
))
. Omitting these
intervals is valid as we are deriving a lower bound for AR(1-Nearest Neighbor(S), z). We conclude
using the union bound over two intervals L− and L+ to obtain:
P
[
AR(1-Nearest Neighbor(S), z) ≤ z
2
e−2z−2
]
≤ 2 · (1− κ(z))m. (17)
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Lower-bounding QC. To prove a lower-bound on the QC of 1-NN applied to this task we will
use Theorem 4. This means that we need to upper-bound:
sup
p: z-perturbation
PS
[
µ(p−1(E(1-Nearest Neighbor(S)))) ≥ AR(1-Nearest Neighbor(S), z)
2
]
,
where S is generated from the two independent Poisson processes as described at the beginning of
the proof. By Remark 1 we can use Theorem 4 in this case. Let p be a z-perturbation. We analyze
only one of the intervals, namely L−, as the situation for L+ is symmetric. For i ∈ N+ ∪ {0} let Z˜i
be a non-negative random variable defined as:
Z˜i := ν(p
−1([x−i + z, x
−
i+1 − z))).
Note that by construction:
|A−|∑
i=0
Z˜i ≥ ν(p−1(E(S)) ∩ L−), (18)
as for every two consecutive points a, b ∈ A− we have E(S) ∩ [a, b] ⊆ [a + z, b − z]. We divide
Z˜i’s into k groups, where k will be chosen later. For i ∈ N+ ∪ {0} we define:
Z˜i mod ki/k := Z˜i.
Let g ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. We will upper-bound the probability:
P
d2m/ke∑
i=0
Z˜gi ≥
z
2k
· e−2z−2 ·m
 .
Let i ∈ [d2m/ke] and x−0 , x−1 , . . . , x−(i−1)k+g+1 ∈ R be an increasing sequence such that x−0 < 0 <
x−1 . Then we have:
E
[
Z˜gi
∣∣∣X−0 = x−0 , X−1 = x−1 , . . . , X−(i−1)k+g+1 = x−(i−1)k+g+1]
=
∫ ∞
x−
(i−1)k+g+1
PS
[
p(t) ∈
[
X−i·k+g + z,X
−
i·k+g+1 − z
]∣∣∣X−0 = x−0 , . . . , X−(i−1)k+g+1 = x−(i−1)k+g+1] dt
=
∫ ∞
x−
(i−1)k+g+1
∫ ∞
x−
(i−1)k+g+1
fX−i·k+g−X−(i−1)k+g+1(x
′ − x−(i−1)k+g+1)·
· P[p(t) ∈ [Xi·k+g + z,Xi·k+g+1 − z]|Xi·k+g = x′] dx′dt
=
∫ ∞
x−
(i−1)k+g+1
∫ p(t)−z
x−
(i−1)k+g+1
(x′ − x−(i−1)k+g+1)k−1 · e−(x
′−x−
(i−1)k+g+1)
(k − 1)! · e
−(p(t)−x′+z)dx′dt
=
∫ ∞
x−
(i−1)k+g+1
e
−p(t)+x−
(i−1)k+g+1−z ·
(p(t)− x−(i−1)k+g+1 − z)k
k!
dt
≤ e−2z max
p′:z-perturbation
∫ ∞
0
e−(p
′(t)−z) · (p
′(t)− z)k
k!
dt (19)
where in the first equality it is enough to integrate starting from x−(i−1)k+g+1 as p is a z-perturbation
and the leftmost point that can potentially belong to
[
x−i·k+g + z, x
−
i·k+g+1 − z
]
is x−(i−1)k+g+1.
The second equality comes from conditioning on the value ofXi·k+g and independence ofX−i·k+g−
X−(i−1)k+g+1 of X
−
0 , . . . , X
−
(i−1)k+g+1. The third equality follows from three facts:
• X−i·k+g −X−(i−1)k+g+1 is distributed according to Erlang distribution with parameters k −
1, 1, because, by construction, it is a sum of k − 1 i.i.d. exponential random variables with
parameter 1,
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• for p(t) ∈
[
x−i·k+g + z, x
−
i·k+g+1 − z
]
one needs p(t) − z ≥ x−i·k+g and x−i·k+g+1 ≥
p(t) + z,
• X−i·k+g+1 −X−i·k+g is distributed according to the exponential distribution and is indepen-
dent of X−i·k+g −X−(i−1)k+g .
Now we bound the expression from equation 19. Function e−x · xkk! is increasing on [−∞, k] and
decreasing on [k,∞] thus a p∗ that maximizes maxp′:z-perturbation
∫∞
0
e−(p
′(t)−z) · (p′(t)−z)kk! dt can
be set to:
p∗(t) :=

t+ z, if t ∈ [0, k),
k + z, if t ∈ [k, k + 2z),
t− z, otherwise.
Function e−t · tkk! is the density function of the Erlang distribution with parameters (k, 1) thus:∫ ∞
0
e−(p
∗(t)−z) · (p
∗(t)− z)k
k!
dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
e−t · t
k
k!
dt+ 2z · e−k · k
k
k!
≤ 1 + 2z√
2pik
By Stirling factorial bounds (20)
Combining equation 19 and equation 20 we get that for k ≥ 2z2/pi:
E
[
Z˜gi
∣∣∣X−0 = x−0 , X−1 = x−1 , . . . , X−(i−1)k+g+1 = x−(i−1)k+g+1] ≤ 2 · e−2z . (21)
Moreover as the lengths of intervals are independent we get that for every i ∈ N+ ∪ {0}:
P
[
Z˜gi = 0|X−0 = x−0 , X−1 = x−1 , . . . , X−(i−1)k+g+1 = x−(i−1)k+g+1
]
≥ 1− e−2z (22)
and ∀t ≥ 0:
P
[
Z˜gi ≥ t+ 2z|X−0 = x−0 , X−1 = x−1 , . . . , X−(i−1)k+g+1 = x−(i−1)k+g+1
]
≤ e−t−2z . (23)
equation 22 follows from the fact that if x−i+1 − x−i < 2z then Zi = 0 and equation 23 follows
from the fact that if x−i+1 − x−i ≤ t then Zi ≤ t as p can move at most t of mass into an interval
of length t − 2z. Now we bound the probability that sum of variables from the g-th group deviates
considerably from its expectation. The idea is to use a method similar to the proof of the Chernoff
bound. For every s > 0:
P
d2m/ke∑
i=0
Z˜gi ≥
z
2k
e−2z−2 ·m

≤ P
[
Z˜g0 ≥
z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m
]
+ P
d2m/ke∑
i=1
Z˜gi ≥
z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m
 By the union bound (24)
We bound the two terms from equation 24 separately. Using equation 23 we get that for m ≥
4e2z+2k:
P
[
Z˜g0 ≥
z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m
]
≤ exp
(
− z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m
)
(25)
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Now we bound the second term from equation 24:
P
d2m/ke∑
i=1
Z˜gi ≥
z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m

≤ P
exp
s d2m/ke∑
i=1
Z˜gi
 ≥ exp(s · z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m
)
≤ E
exp
s d2m/ke∑
i=1
Z˜gi
 · exp(−s · z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m
)
By Markov inequality
≤ E
d2m/ke∏
i=1
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Z˜gi −
z
16
e−2z−2
))] (26)
Using the chain rule we obtain:
E
d2m/ke∏
i=1
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Z˜gi −
z
16
e−2z−2
))]
E
d2m/ke−1∏
i=1
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Z˜gi −
z
16
e−2z−2
))]
· E
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Z˜gi −
z
16
e−2z−2
))∣∣∣{Z˜gi }d2m/ke−1i=1 ]

(27)
Using the fact that variables X−0 , . . . , X
−
(i−1)k+g+1 determine values of Z˜
g
0 . . . , Z˜
g
i−1 and
the bounds from equation 21, equation 22 and equation 23 hold for all possible realiza-
tions of X−0 , . . . , X
−
(i−1)k+g+1 if we maximize the inner conditional expectation of equa-
tion 27 over variables Z˜gi satisfying properties 21, 22 and 23 we can get an upper bound on
P
[∑d2m/ke
i=0 Z˜
g
i ≥ z2e−2z−2 ·m
]
via equation 24, 25 and 26. More formally if we consider a class
of random variables Z satisfying the following properties:
1. Z ≥ 0
2. E[Z] ≤ 2 · e−2z ,
3. P[Z = 0] ≥ 1− e−2z ,
4. ∀t ≥ 0 P[Z ≥ t+ 2z] ≤ e−t−2z .
and we show that for some C ∈ R there exists a function ξ′ : (C,∞) −→ R+ such that:
inf
s∈R+
sup
Z:Z satisfies 1, 2, 3 and 4
E
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Z − z
16
e−2z−2
))]
≤ 1− ξ′(z), (28)
then, by setting k := 2z2/pi, there exists a function ξ : (C,∞) −→ R+:
P
d2m/ke∑
i=0
Z˜gi ≥
z
2k
e−2z−2 ·m
 ≤ exp(− z
4k
e−2z−2 ·m
)
+(1−ξ′(z))m/k ≤ (1−ξ(z))m. (29)
Now we will prove equation 28. For ζ ∈ [e−2z,∞) let a non-negative random variableZζ be defined
as:
1. P[Zζ = 0] = 1− e−ζ
2. fZζ (t) =
{
0 if t ∈ (0, ζ)
e−t otherwise
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We argue that a variable Z that maximizes equation 28 has to be belong to {Zζ}ζ∈[e−2z,∞). Assume
for the sake of contradiction that Z is a random variable that satisfies 1, 2, 3, 4, Z 6∈ {Zζ}ζ∈[e−2z,∞)
and Z maximizes equation 28. Then this means that there exists t ∈ [2z,∞) such that P[Z ∈
(0, t)] > 0 and P[Z ≥ t] < e−t. Then one can distribute the mass from (0, t) without changing E[Z]
and violating Property 4 to increase E
[
exp
(
s · (Z − z16e−2z−2))]. This gives us a contradiction.
Now let ζ ∈ [e−2z,∞]. Note that:
E[Zζ ] =
∫ ∞
ζ
te−tdt = (1 + ζ)e−ζ . (30)
Now we bound:
E
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Zζ − z
16
e−2z−2
))]
≤ E
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Zζ − z
32e2
E[Zζ ]
))]
By Property 2
= exp
(
−s z
32e2
(1 + ζ)e−ζ
)
· E [exp (s · (Zζ))] By equation 30
= exp
(
−s z
32e2
(1 + ζ)e−ζ
)
·
[
1− e−ζ +
∫ ∞
ζ
este−tdt
]
= exp
(
−s z
32e2
(1 + ζ)e−ζ
)
·
[
1− e−ζ + 1
1− se
(s−1)ζ
]
Provided that s < 1 (31)
Taking derivative of equation 31 with respect to s and evaluating at s = 0 gives:
− 1
32e2
e−ζ(z − 32e2)(1 + ζ), (32)
which as long as z > 32e2 is negative. Note that expression from equation 31 evaluated at s = 0
is equal to 1. Combining these facts we get that there exists a function ξ′ : (32e2,∞) −→ R+ such
that:
inf
s∈R+
sup
Z:Z satisfies 1, 2, 3 and 4
E
[
exp
(
s ·
(
Z − z
16
e−2z−2
))]
≤ 1− ξ′(z).
But this means that we have proven equation 29. Thus we get that there exists a function ψ :
(32e2,∞) −→ R+ such that:
P
[
ν(p−1(E(S)) ∩ L−) ≥ z
2
· e−2z−2 ·m
]
≤ P
|A−|∑
i=0
Z˜i ≥ z
2
· e−2z−2 ·m
 By equation 18
≤ P
[(
2m∑
i=0
Z˜i ≥ z
2
· e−2z−2 ·m
)
∨ (|A−| > 2m)
]
≤ P
[
2m∑
i=0
Z˜i ≥ z
2
· e−2z−2 ·m
]
+ 2e−
m2
2(m+m) Union bound and equation 8
≤ k · (1− ξ(z))m + 2e−m/4 By equation 29 and union bound over groups
≤ 2z
2
pi
· (1− ξ(z))m + 2e−m/4 By setting of k
≤ 4z2 · (1− ψ(z))m
The above fact and the union bound over the intervals L− and L+ together with equation 17 shows
that if z > 32e2 then:
sup
p: z-perturbation
PS
[
µ(p−1(E(S))) ≥ AR(1-Nearest Neighbor(S), z)
2
]
≤ 2 · (1− κ(z))m + 8z2 · (1− ψ(z))m
≤ 8z2 · (1−min(κ(z), ψ(z)))m.
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This, by Theorem 4, means that if z > 32e2 then:
QC(1-Nearest Neighbor, Tintervals, 2m, z) ≥ Θ
(
log
(
1
8z2 · (1−min(κ(z), ψ(z)))m
))
≥ Θ
(
m · log
(
1
1−min(κ(z), ψ(z))
))
≥ Θ(m).
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D OMITTED PROOFS - QUADRATIC NEURAL NETWORK
We now present proofs of claims from Section 4.2. Recall that that section deals with quadratic
neural nets applied to the concentric spheres dataset.
D.1 QC LOWER BOUNDS FOR EXPONENTIALLY SMALL RISK
We first use the results from Section 3 to argue that increased accuracy leads to increased robustness.
It was experimentally shown in Gilmer et al. (2018) that increasing the sample size for QNN leads
to a higher accuracy on the CS dataset. Thus we assume that for some m ∈ N the following holds:
PS∼Dm [R(QNN(S)) ≤ δ] ≥ 1− δ. (33)
Moreover note that D is symmetric and thus it is natural to assume that every point is misclassified
with the same probability. Formally:
PS∼Dm [ALG(S)(x) 6= h(x)] is constant for x ∈ Sd−11 ∪ Sd−11.3 . (34)
Using equation 33 we bound:∫
Rd
PS∼Dm [ALG(S)(x) 6= h(x)] dµ = ES∼Dm [R(QNN)]
≤ δ · PS∼Dm [R(QNN(S)) ≤ δ] + 1 · (1− PS∼Dm [R(QNN(S)) ≤ δ]) ≤ 2δ,
which by equation 34 gives that ∀x ∈ supp(D), PS∼Dm [ALG(S)(x) 6= h(x)] ≤ 2δ. Finally for  =
0.3 we have ∀ S ∈ supp(Dm) AR(QNN(S), ) ≥ 1/2, as the distance between the classes is 0.3.
Combining the properties and applying Theorem 1 we get: QC(QNN,CS,m, 0.3) ≥ log ( 112δ ) . In
words, if QNN has a risk of 2−Ω(k) then it is secure against Θ(k)-bounded adversaries for  = 0.3.
D.2 QC LOWER BOUNDS FOR CONSTANT RISK
Now present QC lower bounds for the case where the risk achieved by the network is as large as
a constant. To get started, let us formally define the distributions and error sets that we will be
concerned with. Recall that for y ∈ Sd−11 we define cap(y, r, τ) := Sd−1r ∩ {x ∈ Rd : 〈x, y〉 ≥ τ}.
Let τ : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] be such that for every δ ∈ [0, 1] we have µ(cap(·, 1, τ(δ)))/µ(Sd−11 ) = δ.
Definition 6. (Distributions on Spherical Caps)
• Cap. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). We define Cap(δ) as a distribution on subsets of Sd−11 defined by the
following process: generate y ∼ U [Sd−11 ]. Return: cap(y, 1, τ(δ)).
• Capsi.i.d.k . Let k ∈ N+, δ ∈ (0, 1). We define Capsi.i.d.k (δ) as a distribution on subsets
of Sd−11 ∪ Sd−11.3 defined by the following process: generate a sequence of random bits
b1, . . . , bk ∼ U{−1, 1}, generate a sequence of random vectors y1, . . . , yk ∼ U [Sd−11 ].
Return: ⋃
i:bi=−1
cap(yi, 1, τ(δ/k)) ∪
⋃
i:bi=+1
cap(yi, 1.3, 1.3τ(δ/k))
In words Capsk(δ) generates k i.i.d. uniformly distributed spherical caps occupying δ/k
µ-volume of a random sphere from Sd−11 , S
d−1
1.3 .
• CapsGk . Let k ∈ N+, δ ∈ (0, 1), G be a distribution on (Sd−11 )k. We define CapsGk (δ)
as a distribution on subsets of Sd−11 ∪ Sd−11.3 defined by the following process: generate a
sequence of random bits b1, . . . , bk ∼ U{−1, 1}, generate y1, . . . , yk ∼ G, generate an
orthonormal matrix M ∼ O(d). Return:⋃
i:bi=−1
M(cap(yi, 1, τ(δ/k))) ∪
⋃
i:bi=+1
M(cap(yi, 1.3, 1.3τ(δ/k)))
In words CapsGk (δ) generates k randomly rotated spherical caps occupying δ/k µ-volume
of a random sphere from Sd−11 , S
d−1
1.3 , where relative positions of normal vectors of the
caps are defined by G.
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Note that definitions of Capsi.i.d.k and Caps
G
k are compatible in the following sense:
Observation 1. For every k ∈ N+, δ ∈ (0, 1), Capsi.i.d.k (δ) = CapsU [(S
d−1
1 )
k]
k (δ).
In the following lemma we show a reduction from Capi.i.dk to Cap. This means that we show that if
there is an adversary that uses q queries and succeeds on Capi.i.dk then there exists an adversary that
succeeds on Cap and also asks at most q queries. The takeaway from this lemma is that the QC of
Capi.i.dk is no smaller than the QC of Cap. Formally:
Lemma 2 (Reduction from Capsi.i.d.k to Cap). Let k ∈ N+. If there exists a q-bounded adversary
A that succeeds on Capsi.i.d.k (0.01) with approximation constant 1/2, error probability 0.01 and 
such that cap(·, 1, τ(0.01/k)) + B = cap(·, 1, 0) then there exists a q-bounded adversary A′ that
succeeds on Cap(0.01/k) with approximation constant 12k , error probability of 1− 13k and the same
.
Proof. Algorithm 1 invoked with δ = 0.01 defines the protocol for A′. We will show that this
protocol satisfies the statement of the Lemma.
Algorithm 1 EMULATEIID(f,A, δ, k) . f is the attacked classifier
. A is an adversary for distribution Capi.i.d.k (δ)
1: y1, . . . , yk−1 ∼ U [Sd−11 ]
2: b, b1, . . . , bk−1 ∼ U{−1, 1}
3: T (x) :=

1.3 · x if b = −1 ∧ x ∈ Sd−11
x/1.3 if b = −1 ∧ x ∈ Sd−11.3
x if b = +1
4: for i = 1, . . . , k-1 do
5: Ci :=
{
cap(yi, 1, τ(δ/k)) if bi = −1
cap(yi, 1.3, 1.3τ(δ/k)) if bi = +1
6: p := Simulate A, to query x answer f(T (x)) ∨ (x ∈ C1) ∨ · · · ∨ (x ∈ Ck−1)
7: return p
At the first sight it might seem that the protocol forA′ uses kq queries. But due to the fact that k−1
caps were added artificially the answer to (k−1)q of those queries is known toA′ beforehand. This
gives us that A′ is q-bounded as every query of A′ corresponds to a query of A. Let C ⊆ Sd−11 be
the hidden cap that was generated from Cap. Observe that:
T (C) ∪
k−1⋃
i=1
Ci
is distributed according to Capi.i.d.k , as C1, . . . , Ck−1 are i.i.d. uniformly random spherical caps, C
is a random spherical cap of Sd−11 and T moves the cap C to S
d−1
1.3 with probability 1/2. Thus by
the guarantee for A we know that with probability at least 0.99:
µ
(
p−1
(
T (C) ∪
k−1⋃
i=1
Ci
))
≥ 1
2
· µ
((
T (C) ∪
k−1⋃
i=1
Ci
)
+B
)
As T (C), C1, . . . , Ck are indistinguishable from the point of view of A we get that with probability
at least 0.99/k:
µ
(
p−1(T (C))
) ≥ 1
2k
· µ
((
T (C) ∪
k−1⋃
i=1
Ci
)
+B
)
,
and finally as T = Id with probability 1/2 we get that with probability at least 0.99/2k ≥ 1/3k:
µ
(
p−1(C)
) ≥ 1
2k
· µ
((
T (C) ∪
k−1⋃
i=1
Ci
)
+B
)
,
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where µ
((
T (C) ∪⋃k−1i=1 Ci)+B) ≥ 1/4 as C ⊆ Sd−11 and C + Be covers 1/4 of the mass of
µ. Thus we get that with probability at least 1/3k:
µ
(
p−1(C)
) ≥ 1
8k
,
which is equivalent to A′ succeeding on Cap(0.01/k) with approximation constant of 12k , error
probability of at most 1− 13k for the same .
In the next lemma we generalize Lemma 2 to more complex distributions. More formally we show
that if there is an adversary that uses q queries and succeeds on CapGk then there exists an adversary
that succeeds on Cap and asks at most kq queries. Formally:
Lemma 3 (Reduction from CapsGk to Cap). Let k ∈ N+ and let G be any distribution on (Sd−11 )k.
If there exists a q-bounded adversary A that succeeds on CapsGk (0.01) with approximation constant
1/2, error probability 0.01 and  such that cap(·, 1, τ(0.01/k)) +B = cap(·, 1, 0) then there exists
a kq-bounded adversary A′ that succeeds on Cap(0.01/k) with approximation constant 12k , error
probability 0.51 and the same .
Proof. Algorithm 2 defines the protocol for A′. We will show that this protocol satisfies the state-
ment of the lemma.
Algorithm 2 EMULATEGENERAL(f,A,G, k) . f is the attacked classifier
. A is an adversary for distribution CapGk (0.01)
1: T (x) :=
{
1.3 · x if x ∈ Sd−11
x/1.3 if x ∈ Sd−11.3
2: (y1, . . . , yk) ∼ G
3: for i = 1, . . . , k do
4: Ri := rotation such that Ri(e1) = yi . Any rotation satisfying the condition is valid
5: M ∼ O(d)
6: b1, . . . , bk ∼ U{−1, 1}
7: for i = 1, . . . , k do
8: Ti :=
{
T if bi = −1
Id if bi = +1
9: p := Simulate A, to x answer f(M(R1(T1(x)))) ∨ · · · ∨ f(M(Rk(Tk((x))))
10: for i = 1, . . . , k do
11: pi := T
−1
i ◦R−1i ◦M−1 ◦ p ◦M ◦Ri ◦ Ti
12: return p′ := 1k
∑k
i=1 pi
∣∣∣
Sd−11
+ Id
∣∣∣
Sd−11.3
. understood as a linear combination of transport
maps
First observe that A′ asks at most kq queries as every query of A is multiplied k times (see line 9
of Algorithm 2). Observe that p′ is a well defined -perturbation as all pi’s are -perturbations when
restricted to Sd−11 . It follows from the fact that all pi’s are of the form F
−1 ◦ p ◦ F where F is a
composition of an isometry and either T or the identity. This implies that for all x ∈ Sd−11 we have
‖x− F−1 ◦ p ◦ F (x)‖2 ≤ . Let C ⊆ Sd−11 be the hidden spherical cap. Observe that:
k⋃
i=1
M(Ri(Ti(C)))
is distributed according to CapGk , as the relative positions of normal vectors of
M(R1(C)),M(R2(C)), . . . ,M(Rk(C)) are distributed according to the process: generate
(y′1, . . . , y
′
k) ∼ G, M ′ ∼ O(d), return M ′((y′1, . . . , y′k)). Thus by the fact that A succeeds with
α = 1/2 we know that with probability at least 0.99:
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µ(
p−1
(
k⋃
i=1
M(Ri(Ti(C)))
))
≥ 1
2
· µ
((
k⋃
i=1
M(Ri(Ti(C)))
)
+B
)
.
Observe that:
µ
(1
k
k∑
i=1
pi
)−1
(C)
 = 1
k
k∑
i=1
µ
(
p−1(M(Ri(Ti(C))))
) ≥ 1
k
·µ
(
p−1
(
k⋃
i=1
M(Ri(Ti(C)))
))
Combining the two bounds we get that with probability at least 0.99:
µ
(
p′−1(C)
) ≥ 1
2k
· µ
((
k⋃
i=1
M(Ri(Ti(C)))
)
+B
)
(35)
We note that with probability at least 1/2 there exists i0 ∈ [k] such that Ti0 = Id. This means that
with probability at least 1/2:
µ
((
k⋃
i=1
M(Ri(Ti(C)))
)
+B
)
≥ 1/4, (36)
as µ(M(Ri0(Ti0(C))) +B) = µ(S
d−1
1 )/2. Combining equation 35 and equation 36 and using the
union bound we get that with probability of at least 0.49:
µ(p′−1(C)) ≥ 1
8k
,
which is equivalent to A′ succeeding on Cap(0.01/k) with approximation constant of at least 12k ,
error probability of at most 0.51 for the same .
The following tail bound will be useful.
Lemma 4. Let X be a zero-mean Gaussian with variance σ2. Then for every t ≥ 0:
1√
2pi
·
(
1
t
− 1
t3
)
· e−t2/2 ≤ PX∼N (0,σ2)[X ≥ σ · t] ≤ 1√
2pi
· 1
t
· e−t2/2
In Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we showed that the QC of Capi.i.d.k and Cap
G
k can be lower-bounded in
terms of the QC of Cap. We now show an upper bound Θ(d) for the the QC of Cap. Further, we
give the sketch of the proof for a lower bound of Θ(d). The summary of these results is presented
in Table 1.
The upper-bound for Cap, that we are going to show, holds even if we restrict the adversary to be
non-adaptive. I.e., the bound holds even if we require the adversary to declare the set of queries up
front.
Definition 7 (Non-adaptive query-bounded adversary). For  ∈ R≥0 and f : Rd −→ {−1, 1}
a q-bounded adversary with parameter  is a deterministic algorithm A that asks at most q ∈ N
non-adaptive queries of the form f(x) ?= 1 and outputs an -perturbation A(f) : Rd −→ Rd.
Lemma 5 (Upper bound for Cap). For every d bigger than an absolute constant there exists a
non-adaptive Θ(d)-bounded adversary A that succeeds on Cap(0.01) with approximation constant
1/2, error probability 0.01 for  such that cap(·, 1, τ(0.01)) + B = cap(·, 1, 0). Moreover A can
be implemented in O(d2) time.
Proof. We will first show that there exists a randomizedA that satisfies the statement of the Lemma.
This adversary uses Algorithm 3 invoked with s = Θ(d) as its protocol. Later we will show how to
derandomize the protocol.
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Algorithm 3 CAPADVERSARYRANDOMIZED(f, s, )
. f is the classifier, s is the number of sampled points per sphere
.  is the bound on allowed perturbations
1: Q− :=
{
x−1 , . . . , x
−
s
}
, where x−i ’s are i.i.d. ∼ U [Sd−11 ]
2: Q+ :=
{
x+1 , . . . , x
+
s
}
, where x+i ’s are i.i.d. ∼ U [Sd−11.3 ]
3: R := {x ∈ Q− : f(x) = +1} ∪ {x ∈ Q+ : f(x) = −1}
4: v := 1/|R| ·∑x∈R x
5: p(x) :=
{
argsupx′∈Sd−11 ,‖x−x′‖2≤ 〈x
′ − x, v〉 if x ∈ Sd−11
argsupx′∈Sd1.3,‖x−x′‖2≤ 〈x′ − x, v〉 if x ∈ S
d−1
1.3
6: return p
Randomized algorithm. First notice that A is non-adaptive. The queries asked by A are from
Q− ∪ Q+ which were generated (see lines 1 and 2) before any queries were asked and, hence,
answered were received. Note further that A is Θ(d) bounded as she asks 2 · s = Θ(d) queries.
Run time. We first remark that A can be implemented in O(d2) time as the run time is dominated
by asking Θ(d) queries and each vector is in Rd. Formally, p is not returned explicitly but one can
imagine that A, after preprocessing that takes O(d2) time, provides oracle access to p where each
evaluation takes time O(d).
Now we prove thatA succeeds with probability 0.99 with approximation constant 1/2. Let E be the
hidden spherical cap that contains all errors of 1-NN and let u ∈ Sd−11 be its normal vector. First
assume that E ⊆ Sd−11 . We start by lower-bounding |R|. For every i ∈ [s] let Y −i be a random
variable which is equal to 1 if x−i ∈ E and 0 otherwise. Then, by the Chernoff bound, we have that
for every δ < 1:
P
[∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
i=1
Y −i − E
[
s∑
i=1
Y −i
]∣∣∣∣∣ > δ · E
[
s∑
i=1
Y −i
]]
≤ 2e− δ
2
3 E[
∑s
i=1 Y
−
i ], (37)
Noticing that E
[∑s
i=1 Y
−
i
]
= s · 0.01 if we set δ = 1/2 we get that:
P
[∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
i=1
Y −i − s/100
∣∣∣∣∣ > s/200
]
≤ 2e− δ
2
3 ·s/100 = 2e−s/1200.
So with probability at least 1− 2e−s/1200 we have that:
|R| ≥ s/200. (38)
Now assume R = {z1, . . . , zk} and observe that for every z ∈ R we have 〈z, u〉 ≥ τ(0.01) and
note that zi’s are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)). We will model U [Sd−11 ] as
N (0, 1/d)d. Then we have that:
〈u, v〉 = 1
k
〈
u,
k∑
i=1
zi
〉
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
〈u, zi〉
≥ τ(0.01) as zi ∈ R
≥ 2.2/
√
d by Lemma 4 (39)
Moreover if Π is the orthogonal projection onto u⊥ then Π(k · v) ∼ N (0, k/d)d−1 and Π(v) ∼
N (0, 1/(dk))d−1 thus:
‖Π(v)‖22 ∼
1
dk
· χ2(d− 1)
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So, using standard tail bounds for χ2 distribution, we get that for all t ∈ (0, 1):
P
[∣∣∣∣ dkd− 1 · ‖Π(v)‖22 − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 2e−(d−1)t2/8 (40)
Moreover observe:〈
u,
v
‖v‖2
〉
=
〈u, v〉√
〈u, v〉2 + ‖Π(v)‖22
=
1√
1 + ‖Π(v)‖22/〈u, v〉2
≥ 1√
1 + d2.22 · ‖Π(v)‖22
by equation 39 (41)
Observe that if ^(u, v/‖v‖2) = 0 then µ(p−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)))) = 1/4, as the preimage is
exactly half of the sphere Sd−11 . Moreover µ(p
−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)))) is a continuous function
of ^(u, v/‖v‖2). Observe that in a coordinate system where the first basis vector is v/‖v‖2 we
have p(µ|Sd−11 ) ≈ (N (τ(0.01), 1/d),N (0, 1/d), . . . ,N (0, 1/d)). Assume ^(u, v/‖v‖2) = α. We
bound:
µ(p−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01))))
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
τ(0.01)−x1 cos(α)
sin(α)
d/2pi · e− d2 ((x1−τ(0.01))2+x22) dx2 dx1
≥
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
2.4/
√
d−x1 cos(α)
sin(α)
d/2pi · e− d2 ((x1−2.2/
√
d)2+x22) dx2 dx1 by Lemma 4
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
2.4−x′1 cos(α)
sin(α)
1/2pi · e− 12 ((x′1−2.2)2+x′22 ) dx′2 dx′1 x′1 = x1 ·
√
d, x′2 = x2 ·
√
d
This means that there exists α ∈ (0, pi/2] (independent of d) such that for all v such that
^(u, v/‖v‖2) ≤ α we have µ(p−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)))) ≥ 1/5. Thus by equation 41 we get
that there exists ξ > 0 such that if ‖Π(v)‖22 ≤ ξ/d then ^(u, v/‖v‖2) ≤ α and in turn
µ(p−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)))) ≥ 1/5.
Setting k := 2dξ , t := 1/2 in equation 40 we get that with probability at least 1 − e−(d−1)/32 we
have:
‖Π(v)‖22 ≤ ξ/d,
which in turn means that with probability at least 1− e−(d−1)/32:
µ(p−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)))) ≥ 1/5. (42)
Now combining equation 38, equation 42 and the union bound we get that if we set s := 400dξ then
with probability at least 1− 2e−s/200 − e−(d−1)/32 = 1− 2e−2d/ξ − e−(d−1)/32 we have:
µ(p−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)))) ≥ 1/5. (43)
This probability is bigger than 0.99 if d is bigger than an absolute constant that depends on ξ.
Observing that µ(E + B) = 1/4 we conclude that if E ⊆ Sd−11 then if s = Θ(d) then with
probability 0.99 A succeeds on Cap with approximation constant at least 1/2. To finish the proof
one notices that the case E ⊆ Sd−11.3 is analogous. The final constant hidden under Θ(d) for the
number of samples is a maximum of constants for Sd−11 and S
d−1
1.3 .
Deterministic algorithm. We know show how to derandomize Algorithm 3 to design an adversary
Adet. We observe that in Algorithm 3 randomness was used only to generate query points Q−, Q+.
Instead of generating the query points randomly we use fixed sets. We define the deterministic
adversary, Adet, as:
Adet := CAPADVERSARYDETERMINISTIC(·, Q−, Q+),
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for fixed (for a given d) sets Q−, Q+ that we define next.
Algorithm 4 CAPADVERSARYDETERMINISTIC(f,Q−, Q+, )
. f is the classifier, Q−, Q+ are query points on Sd−11 , S
d−1
1.3 respectively
.  is the bound on allowed perturbations
1: R := {x ∈ Q− : f(x) = +1} ∪ {x ∈ Q+ : f(x) = −1}
2: v := 1/|R| ·∑x∈R x
3: p(x) :=
{
argsupx′∈Sd−11 ,‖x−x′‖2≤ 〈x
′ − x, v〉 if x ∈ Sd−11
argsupx′∈Sd1.3,‖x−x′‖2≤ 〈x′ − x, v〉 if x ∈ S
d−1
1.3
4: return p
For u ∈ Sd−11 let:
fu(x) :=
{−1 if x ∈ Sd−11 \ cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)
+1 otherwise
.
We say that an adversary succeeds on fu if she, run for fu, returns p such that
µ(p−1(cap(u, 1, τ(0.01)))) ≥ 1/8. From equation 43 we know that for every d ∈ N+, for ev-
ery u ∈ Sd−11 :
Px−1 ,...,x−400d/ξ∼U[Sd−11 ] [A(fu, 400d/ξ, ) succeeds] ≥ 1− 2e
−2d/ξ − e−(d−1)/32
Thus we get that for every d ∈ N+ that:
Pu,x−1 ,...,x−400d/ξ∼U[Sd−11 ] [A(fu, 400d/ξ, ) succeeds] ≥ 1− 2e
−2d/ξ − e−(d−1)/32
And finally, this means that for every d ∈ N+ there exists Q−d ⊆ Sd−11 , |Q−d | = 400d/ξ such that:
Pu∼U[Sd−11 ]
[Adet(fu, Q−d , ∅, ) succeeds] ≥ 1− 2e−2d/ξ − e−(d−1)/32
Thus, for d bigger than an absolute constant we get that conditioned on E ⊆ Sd−11 Adet run with
Q− = Q−d succeeds with probability at least 0.99 and asks |Q−d | = Θ(d) queries. Analogous
argument shows that for every d ∈ N+ there exists Q+d ⊆ Sd−11.3 , |Q+d | = Θ(d) such that the
following holds. For every d bigger than an absolute constant conditioned on E ⊆ Sd−11.3 Adet run
with Q+ = Q+d succeeds with probability at least 0.99. Combining these two results we get thatAdet satisfies statement of the lemma.
Remark 2. As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 5 it was more natural to design an adversary
that was randomized. We believe that allowing the adversary to use randomness would not change
the results in a fundamental way.
Lemma 1 (Lower bound for Cap). There exists δ > 0 such that if a q-bounded adversary A
succeeds on Cap(0.01) with approximation constant ≥ 1 − δ, error probability 2/3 for  such that
cap(·, 1, τ(0.01)) +B = cap(·, 1, 0). Then
q ≥ Θ(d).
Proof. To simplify computations we will sometimes approximate the uniform distribution on Sd−11
as a d dimensional normal distributions: N (0, 1d). This change is valid as the norm ofN (0, 1d)d is
closely concentrated around 1.
Lower-bounding QC. To use Theorem 4 we think that there is an algorithm ALG for which
the distribution of errors coincides with Cap(0.01). We recall that in this case µ is a normalized
Lebesgue measure on Sd−11 . Note that by definition AR(ALG(S), ) = 1/2. Thus we analyze:
sup
p: -perturbation
PS∼Dm
[
µ(p−1(E(ALG(S)))) ≥ (1− δ) ·AR(ALG(S), )]
= sup
p: -perturbation
PE∼Cap(0.01)
[
µ(p−1(E)) ≥ 1− δ
2
]
, (44)
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for a constant δ that will be fixed later. Let p be an -perturbation and y ∈ Sd−11 be such that
µ(p−1(cap(y, 1, τ(0.01)))) ≥ 1−δ2 . We will show that for every x ∈ Sd−11 if ^(y, x) ∈
[
49pi
100 ,
51pi
100
]
then µ(p−1(cap(y, 1, τ(0.01)))) < 1−δ2 . This will conclude the proof as then:
PE∼Cap(0.01)
[
µ(p−1(E)) ≥ 1− δ
2
]
≤ 2 · µ
(
cap
(
·, 1, arccos
(
49pi
100
)))
≤ 2−Ω(d) By Lemma 4
combined with equation 44 and Theorem 4 gives the result.
Now let x ∈ Sd−11 be such that ^(y, x) ∈
[
49pi
100 ,
51pi
100
]
. To simplify notation let Cx :=
cap(x, 1, τ(0.01)), Cy := cap(y, 1, τ(0.01)). Now define:
I :=
{
z ∈ Sd−11
∣∣ d(z, Cy) ≤  ∧ d(z, Cx) ≤  ∧ d(z, Cx ∩ Cy) > } ,
where d denotes the `2 distance between sets. By Lemma 4 we have:
2.2/
√
d ≤ τ(0.01) ≤ 2.4/
√
d (45)
which in turn by definition of  gives that for d > 15:
 ≤
√√√√2.42
d
+
(
1−
√
1− 2.4
2
d
)2
≤ 3/
√
d (46)
Now observe that:
I ⊇
{
z ∈ Sd−11
∣∣∣∣ 〈z, y〉 ≥ 0 ∧ 〈z, x〉 ≥ 0 ∧〈z, x+ y‖x+ y‖2
〉
<
2.2√
d · cos(^(y, x)/2) −
3√
d
}
⊇
{
z ∈ Sd−11
∣∣∣∣ 〈z, y〉 ≥ 0 ∧ 〈z, x〉 ≥ 0 ∧〈z, x+ y‖x+ y‖2
〉
<
1
20
√
d
}
=: Î (47)
where in the first transition we used equation 45 and equation 46 and in the second transition we
used that ^(y, x) ∈ [ 49pi100 , 51pi100 ]. Note that µ(Î) is minimized for ^(y, x) = 51pi100 . Thus:
µ
(
Î
)
≥
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
tan(pi/100)·x1
d/2pi · e− d2 (x21+x22) · 1
[
x1 cos
(
51pi
200
)
+ x2 sin
(
51pi
200
)
<
1
20
√
d
]
dx2 dx1
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
tan(pi/100)·x1
1/2pi · e− 12 (x21+x22) · 1
[
x1 cos
(
51pi
200
)
+ x2 sin
(
51pi
200
)
<
1
20
]
dx2 dx1,
(48)
where the first equality comes from integration by substitution. The integral from equation 48 is
positive, which means that there exists δ > 0 such that µ(Î) > δ. Combining that with equation 47
we get that µ(I) > δ. Observe that by definition of I for every z ∈ I we have that at most one of
p(z) ∈ Cx, p(z) ∈ Cy can be true. Thus, using the fact that µ(Cx +B) = µ(Cx +B) = 1/2, we
get that:
min(µ(p−1(Cx)), µ(p−1(Cy))) < 1/2− δ/2. (49)
This ends the proof as by assumption we know that µ(p−1(Cy)) ≥ 1/2 − δ/2, so by equation 49
we get that µ(p−1(Cx)) < 1/2− δ/2.
Note that Lemma 1 is equivalent to the statement of Conjecture 1 for k = 1.
Conjecture 1 (Cap conjecture). For every k ∈ [d] if a q-bounded adversary A succeeds on
Cap(0.01/k) with approximation constant ≥ 12k , error probability ≤ 1 − 13k for  such that
cap(·, 1, τ(0.01/k)) +B = cap(·, 1, 0). Then
q ≥ Θ(d).
31
E FIGURES
In Figure 2, similar to Figure 1, we present visualizations of decision boundaries for 1-NN. Each
subfigure represents a random decision boundary for a different sample S ∼ Dm. The aim of these
visualizations is to give an intuition for why Theorem 2 is true.
Figure 2: Random decision boundaries of 1-NN for Tintervals.
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